NYT: A closer look at Intel v Hamidi
The New York Times takes a closer look at the California Supreme Court's recent decision against Intel in a case where the technology giant—arguably the biggest benificiary from the unqiquity of the Internet—attempted to use a principle of property law rooted in the physical world to silence an outspoken critic.

Intel sued on two counts in 1998. One, later dropped, contended that the messages were a nuisance to Intel and its employees. The second was a "trespass to chattel" claim against Mr. Hamidi, that accused him, among other things, of disrupting Intel through unauthorized use of its computer system. "We disagree with everything he says about Intel," [Intel spokesman] Mr. Mulloy said. "We think he's wrong. But we never did anything to try to prevent him from setting up his Web site or leafleting at universities.

"When someone is using our e-mail system, though, our thinking was that we had certain rights."

Intel does have certain rights, of course. The most important would be the right to respond. Instead, they chose the perilous course of further confusing the line between the virtual and the physical, the limitless and the scarce, by claiming that Hamidi's "use" of Intel's "property"—in this case their e-mail system—somehow damaged Intel.

Hamidi's victory is important because the Internet is all about unnanounced access. Google spiders millions of sites daily. Hyperlinks create billions of serendipitous visits. The application of a legal principle designed to keep strangers from kicking my sheep as they grazed in my field is fraught with consequences that would have rendered the Internet as we know it unworkable.