Schneier on Security: Last Week's Terrorism Arrests

None of the airplane security measures implemented because of 9/11 -- no-fly lists, secondary screening, prohibitions against pocket knives and corkscrews -- had anything to do with last week's arrests. And they wouldn't have prevented the planned attacks, had the terrorists not been arrested. A national ID card wouldn't have made a difference, either.

Instead, the arrests are a victory for old-fashioned intelligence and investigation. Details are still secret, but police in at least two countries were watching the terrorists for a long time. They followed leads, figured out who was talking to whom, and slowly pieced together both the network and the plot.

Exactly. Schneier then goes on to say that, in the face of uncertainty regarding whether the conspiracy has been completely contained, a temporarily expanded airport security regime "seem(s) prudent." I disagree for a few reasons. First, would a more fruitful use of security resources be to expand the search of possible co-conspirators through the existing suspects' physical and logical connections? For this conspiracy to have worldwide elements or cells still undiscovered and operational, they would have had to, at some point, connect with the people already under arrest or investigation. This global anti-liquid dragnet isn't enhancing security, it's treating an extremely remote possibility as a risk.

As Cory and I pointed out, if this is a good idea now, it should have been a good idea since '94, and it'll be a good idea indefinitely.

Of course, that's why Schneier hopes these measures are temporary; in the long run, they're just handwaving:

Banning box cutters since 9/11, or taking off our shoes since Richard Reid, has not made us any safer. And a long-term prohibition against liquid carry-ons won't make us safer, either. It's not just that there are ways around the rules, it's that focusing on tactics is a losing proposition.

It's easy to defend against what the terrorists planned last time, but it's shortsighted. If we spend billions fielding liquid-analysis machines in airports and the terrorists use solid explosives, we've wasted our money. If they target shopping malls, we've wasted our money. Focusing on tactics simply forces the terrorists to make a minor modification in their plans. There are too many targets -- stadiums, schools, theaters, churches, the long line of densely packed people before airport security -- and too many ways to kill people.

And so many ways to sow fear.